# Approved For Release 2001/03/04: CIA-RDP81B00701R000200180001-3

DD/I Notice No. 50-100-1 DD/I N 60-100-1 1 December 1961

LYAISON WITH DEFFESE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA)

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
Reference: CIA

(1 April 61)

1. The following OCR personnel have been officially accredited as CIA Maison Officers to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

25X1A Name	Raine	Component	Room	Telephone	
		Liaison Staff, CR	2E45	5606, 6317	
		Liaison Staff, CR	2E45	5606, 6317	
		Liaison Staff. CR	2E45	5606, 6317	

2. The above named Liaison Officers will represent the Agency at the working level in the coordination of intelligence collection requirements initiated within CIA and also act as a focal point for the processing of collection requirements served on the Agency by DIA intelligence components. Other matters involving interagency support should be coordinated through this established liaison channel.



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DD/I Notice No. 60-1

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DD/I N 60-1 3 March 1971

Guidelines for Release of CIA Finished Intelligence

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### Genera1

Within the overall concern for the security of sources and methods of U.S. intelligence, the policy for the release is based on two factors. of intelligence first is that by government-to-government agreements, the U.S. has an obligation to furnish with intelligence 25X1C on certain subjects and areas. The second principle is that intelligence, over and above that called for in the above agreements, will not be released unless there is a clear and definable benefit to the U.S. which is likely to be gained by 25X1C such release. This benefit may take several forms: e.g., to encourage to the U.S. or to provide with information which might 25X1C influence a policy decision or action on their part favorable to the U.S. on a pending issue. Obviously application of the 25X1C second principle will require flexibility and forethought.

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2. An item of intelligence should be released only once. An example would be the case of a topic covered by a Weekly Review article and released.

If this article is expanded to an Intelligence Memorandum, it should not be released unless it contains significant additional intelligence. No special efforts should be made to sanitize material for release unless there is a clear benefit to the U.S.

#### Specific Guidelines

3. The Deputy Director for Intelligence has determined that current intelligence items and related topics) appearing in the Central Intelligence

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgroding and
declassification

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<sup>\*</sup> The United States Intelligence Board, following the guidelines and procedures set forth in USIB-D-17.1/25 of 14 March 1968, determines the release or nonrelease of National Intelligence Estimates.

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Bulletin (white and red versions only) and the Weekly Review All other inteland Summary may be passed ligence production is subject to the following rules.

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4. In accordance with government-to-government agreements, the following may be passed

Finished intelligence on the USSR, Communist china, Eastern Europe, Mongolia, and North Korea.

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Finished intelligence on subversive activities undertaken by the Soviet Bloc and Communist China in less developed countries.

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Because of the actual or potential net benefit to the U.S., finished intelligence on certain subjects of current Subjects which interest may be released presently fall in this category are:

Cuba and Cuban subversive activities in Latin America

b.

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The above listing is subject to change by authority of the Deputy Director for Intelligence in the light of emerging 25X1C situations and of evidences of cooperation or noncooperation.

Except as it might fall into one of the categories in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 above, finished intelligence on the following areas will be released only by 25X1C authority of the Deputy Director for Intelligence:

-2-

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, •	a. Latin America	
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	b. Africa	
	с.	
	d. Middle East	
25X6□	e. South and Southeast Asia	
	f. 2	5X1C
25X1C	7. will continue to be invited to the conducted by the Office of Current	
25X1C	Intelligence. The content of these briefings will remain generally unchanged; briefings on Vietnam and related topics will not be given in this forum. Other oral briefings of should generally follow the guidelines set	3
25X1C	forth in paragraphs 4. 5. and 6 above. In the case of requests for informal oral briefings on specific subjects or situations (other than those related to Vietnam) a greater latitude is permissible, particularly if a reasonable justification is presented with the request. Office directors are authorized to exercise their own discretion in these cases; questionable or doubtful cases may be referred to the Deputy Director for Intelligence for decision. Commenting on may continue.	25X10
05)(45)		
25X1B	Vuegraphs, briefing materials, etc.) relating to the USSR, European satellites, Communist China, Mongolia, and North Korea may be released Materials relating	
25X1C	to other areas may not be released. The above guidelines ar applicable also to oral briefings and discussions on photo-interpretation findings and activities.	e
	25X1A	
	EDWARD W. PROCTOR Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence	
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DDI NOTICE NO. 60-2

DDI N 60-2 27 April 1977

VISITS TO U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OFFICES

1. There have been instances when DDI officers have arranged or attempted to arrange visits to military installations or offices in the United States through direct contact with the activities to be visited. While it is recognized that in many instances visits by CIA personnel are made at the request of officials of the military services and the requestors assure that the visit arrangements will be properly processed, such has not always been the case.

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2. The Department of Defense and the military services have an established formal system for the purpose of handling and controlling military support for CIA.

is in daily liaison with the military system and, even though is rarely involved in the visits within the continental U.S., stands ready to assist DDI officers in making visit arrangements using the approved liaison channels.

3. Requests to military installations and offices in the continental U.S. should be directed in writing to the request should include the installation to be visited, the name(s) of the person(s) visiting, the name(s) of the person(s) to be visited, the date(s) of the visit, the purpose of the visit and any other pertinent information.

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Paul V. Walsh
Acting Deputy Director
for Intelligence

Distribution A (1-6)

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